As evidence of the likely failure of the surge strategy in Iraq begins to surface the U.S. is reported to be moving toward a strategy of arming Sunnis so they can defend themselves against Al Queda. It is an almost breathlessly desperate idea, forged in the failure of a four-year disaster and reminiscent of the arms we provided to the Taliban in Afghanistan while they were fighting the Russians. While there are many lessons available from that adventure perhaps the best one would be that the weapons ended up with the forces of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. We all remember them.
A lengthy piece in the NY Times describes some of the risks:
“But critics of the strategy, including some American officers, say it could amount to the Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war. The United States has spent more than $15 billion in building up Iraq’s army and police force, whose manpower of 350,000 is heavily Shiite. With an American troop drawdown increasingly likely in the next year, and little sign of a political accommodation between Shiite and Sunni politicians in Baghdad, the critics say, there is a risk that any weapons given to Sunni groups will eventually be used against Shiites. There is also the possibility the weapons could be used against the Americans themselves.â€
So, we invade Iraq for whatever reason is the current rationale, accomplish the mission in weeks but forget to deal with the aftermath. Four years later the winners appear to be the Shias which creates a little problem with our Sunni friends in Saudi Arabia and Jordan but is welcomed by our ‘enemies†in Iran and Syria. Arms would be provided only to those Sunnis promising not to use them against their Shia neighbors and only against Al Queda. It is understandable that failure can produce desperate measures but will the U.S. really do something this risky?